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Democratic Experimentalism
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon
This essay, written for a volume surveying “contemporary legal
thought”, provides an overview of Democratic Experimentalism, a
perspective that draws on both pragmatist social theory and recent
practical innovations in private and public organization. Normatively,
Democratic Experimentalism aligns with process theories that emphasize
the role of courts in vindicating entitlements through inducing,
collaborating with, and policing institutions, rather than vindicating them
directly through interpretive or policy-engineering techniques. It departs
from some such theories, however, in emphasizing that practice must often
take the form of continuous investigation and revision, rather than the
adoption of definitive solutions already known to at least some social
actors. Descriptively, Democratic Experimentalism purports to give a
better account than other perspectives of important recent developments
in private, public, and international law that aspire to enhance
decentralization and accountability simultaneously.

Democratic Experimentalism is an orientation in contemporary
legal thought that draws on both the critical impulses of modernist theory
and the constructive practice of post-bureaucratic organization.
Some of the core ideas of Democratic Experimentalism were
formulated long ago, notably by pragmatists in the John Dewey mold, but
they have been elaborated in response to social developments of recent
decades. A recurring challenge presented by these developments is
uncertainty, by which we mean the inability to anticipate, much less to
assign a probability to, future states of the world. The constellation of
changes that make contemporary economies more innovative produces
uncertainty: As innovations cascade, breakthroughs in one domain become
relevant in other, distant ones. Deep knowledge of what has gone before
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becomes a poor guide of what is to come. On occasion, innovation results
in catastrophe when unforeseen consequences concatenate in the short
term, as in the financial crisis of 2008, or in the long term, as with climate
change. More often, innovation produces social destabilization, dislocating
branches and even sectors of activity.
At the same time, both the perception of social diversity and the
capacity to respond to it have increased. Immigration has produced
greater cultural diversity. Social and cultural movements demand more
recognition and accommodation of cultural and physical diversity in
employment and social services. Research in both medicine and the social
sciences has detected significant variation in populations previously
treated as homogeneous and has sought to make interventions more
sensitive to such variation.
Increased change and diversity undermine traditional forms of
public intervention premised on stability and uniformity. Both public and
private actors have responded to these demands by creating new forms of
organization—neither markets nor hierarchies—that compensate for the
limits of ex ante knowledge by rapid, deliberate learning from parallel and
collaborative exploration of new risks and possibilities. Simultaneously,
they seek to accommodate diverse circumstances and characteristics both
within and across groups.
Democratic Experimentalism aims to understand the common
features in these responses and to show both that they seek a kind of
accountability we associate with law and that dominant understandings of
law should be revised to make the most of their potential.
I. General Themes
The underpinnings of Democratic Experimentalism lie in
American pragmatist theory, and in mid-twentieth century innovations in
organization.
A. Pragmatism.
The term pragmatism is widely used in contemporary legal
discourse, but it most often connotes merely an eclectic, if not
contemptuous, attitude toward theory. The term as applied to the
orientation discussed here connotes a coherent and germinal body of
thought best set out in the work of John Dewey.
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The pragmatist themes that most influenced twentieth century
American law were instrumentalism and contextualism. Instrumentalism
prescribed a forward-looking approach to legal legitimacy emphasizing
consequences rather than a backward-looking approach emphasizing first
principles or historical continuity. Contextualism insisted that legal norms
be understood in the circumstances in which they were used. It thus
rejected formalism in interpretation and rigid bureaucracy in regulation.
This rejection was long ago absorbed as a standard position in mainstream
legal thought, though never an uncontested one.
Two further points associated with Dewey’s pragmatism, which
did not become part of the mainstream legal thought, were empiricism and
sociability. These premises are central to Democratic Experimentalism.
The empiricist point was rooted in Deweyan psychology. Both
individually and collectively, people form habits and formulate rules that
capture their experience and enable them to deal effectively with their
environment. The process can become dysfunctional, however, when
habit congeals into “routine.”
Then, people continue to operate on
assumptions that respond to past experience without taking account of
changed or new circumstances. When routine encounters dissonant
phenomena, people experience what Dewey called an “irritation.” Such
encounters could be inducements to re-examine taken-for-granted norms
that had congealed into routine.
The pragmatists favored processes
that would productively exploit such encounters. Applied to social policy,
this precept led to an emphasis on provisionality and experiment. As
Dewey said, “[P]olicies and proposals for social action [should] be treated
as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and
executed. They will be experimental in the sense that they will be
entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the
consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and
flexible revision in the light of observed consequences.”
The closest Dewey had to a large-scale model for political
organization was science. He repeatedly suggested that politics should
emulate key features of the institutions of science – the commitment to
testing belief against experience, freedom to criticize established views,
transparency and free access to information, and a sense of collaboration
among peers. In science, as Dewey saw it, anyone is free to challenge
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accepted beliefs. People respond to such changes, not by attempting to
resolve them abstractly, but by agreeing on procedures for testing the
relative merits of competing propositions. A test typically involves
controlled variation to compare the effects of different interventions on a
common material or of a common intervention on different materials. We
measure the results in terms of agreed criteria. And then we assess the
significance of the results for the challenged belief. The resulting
conclusion is not established by bureaucratic fiat or majority vote, but by
an informal consensus among members of a loosely defined community of
practitioners.
The final premise of Dewey’s view was a distinctive conception of
sociability. Dewey held that the individual and the group were mutually
constitutive: neither was intelligible without the other any more than an
alphabet and its letters have meaning except in relation to each other. He
thought that American culture tended to underestimate the personal
satisfactions of collaboration and the extent to which the development of
individual capacities and interests depended on social engagement. His
was not a family conception of sociability, attributing solidarity to shared
background and culture, but a lifeboat conception that associates solidarity
with the possibility and experience of effective collaboration. In a
lifeboat, people collaborate because their welfare depends on it. Diverse
values and perspectives need not be disabling obstacles; they are often
beneficial because they give the group access to a wider range of
knowledge.
The empiricist and sociability premises underwrote a distinctive
argument for democracy. Democracy, Dewey argued, was the politics
best suited for effective problem-solving.
Democracy, with its
commitment to free-speech and official accountability, was least tolerant
of the kind of ossification of belief that the pragmatists saw as the most
basic problem of social order. In addition, by maximizing participation in
public-decisionmaking, democracy was able to bring to bear a larger range
of perspectives and information.
Dewey favored democratic institutions that emphasized
provisionality, deliberation, and decentralization. Norms should be
provisional so that they can be re-examined in the light of experience. Reexamination should take the form of deliberation in which diverse
perspectives are brought to bear. Decentralization is important because
the most productive forms of social engagement occur in “face-to-face

4

relationships by means of direct give-and-take.”
B. Post-Bureaucratic Organization
Dewey’s prominence has fluctuated over the years, but even during
the periods of his greatest influence as a philosopher, his distinctive
political ideas have had surprisingly little currency. One problem is that
their institutional implications have seemed elusive, even mysterious. For
example: How can norms be open to continuous re-assessment and yet
provide the stability needed for effective social order? And how do we
empower diverse local groups while maintaining the ability to coordinate
across and beyond a large nation?
No doubt many found the institutional implications of Dewey’s
work confused or Utopian because they contradicted the basic assumption
widely held throughout much of the twentieth century that there are only
two key types of organization – markets and bureaucracies. Markets
operate through individual contracting and price signals. Bureaucracies
operate through centrally promulgated stable and hierarchical rules.
This assumption was dominant from the Progressive era through
the 1970s, and it is still influential in the legal academy. But elsewhere it
has been recognized that it excludes at least one important category of
organization. This category might be called post-bureaucratic. It includes
a range of organizations that were first observed in the industrial sector in
the mid-twentieth century and have since emerged in many areas of both
public and private spheres. Its distinctive features have been most salient
in “lean production” manufacturing firms, which must adapt to short
product cycles and demand for specialized features, and “high reliability”
organizations such as aviation or nuclear power, where breakdown
threatens catastrophe. Especially influential examples have been the
Toyota Production System and the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine
program. A vast literature on the resulting “learning organizations” has
emerged.
Post-bureaucratic organization is constituted by four features.
None is a defining feature of markets or bureaucracies. All can be seen as
responding to uncertainty.
First, rolling rule regimes. In such a regime, rules govern
comprehensively, but agents are instructed to depart from them when

5

compliance would be inconsistent with the rules’ underlying purposes.
However, agents must signal their departures in ways that trigger review
of their actions, and when the departures are sustained, the rules get rewritten to reflect the new understanding gained from the review. By
contrast, conventional bureaucracies do not authorize rule departures by
subordinate agents, and when departures occur, they tend to respond either
by sanctioning them or, where consistent enforcement is impractical,
ignoring them.
Second, root cause analysis of unexpected adverse events.
“Significant operating events” that signal dysfunction, like unexpected
deaths in a hospital or “near misses” in aviation are analyzed diagnostically
to determine their systemic causes and practices are revised to prevent
them in the future. The triggers of these reviews are neither prices of the
sort that drive markets nor rule departures of the sort that mobilize
corrective intervention in bureaucracies. The assumption is that the
proximate cause of the problem is unlikely to be the root or underlying
cause, and that the underlying cause—unknowable ex ante—could be
associated with a flaw in the design of the overall system. Root-cause
analysis is thus directed, not at detecting breakdowns in systems that
function well when operating as planned, but rather at uncovering the
limits of plans.
Third, peer review. Proactive audit processes trigger examination
of specific instances of frontline processes through collegial dialogue.
Typically, the agent explains what she did, and the reviewers respond to
the explanation and conclude with some evaluation of the actions. In
traditional bureaucracy. superiors are presumed to have more
encompassing and reliable knowledge of circumstances and adequate
responses to them than subordinates, and are therefore best placed to make
rules and review their application. In post-bureaucracy, lower level agents
are presumed to have access to information about problems and solutions
unavailable elsewhere, and therefore to have an important formal role in
revising rules (not just devising local work-arounds) even if this
undermines hierarchy.
Fourth, performance measurement. The regimes specify indicators
that measure aggregate performance. The measurements track both the
extent of compliance with the regime’s norms and the extent to which the
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underlying goals are being achieved. (While the use of indicators has long
been conventional in organizations, they do not appear at all in canonical
accounts of the classic model of bureaucracy, where rules do all the work.
In practice, they appear to be more central in post-bureaucratic
organization.) The measures are used to guide discussion about how
practice can be improved. Discussion begins by considering the efficacy
of the organization’s practices in furthering its goals, but it may reach
reconsideration of whether prior understanding of goals needs revision in
the light of experience. In addition, measures may have to be reconsidered
and revised because they failed to capture the factors originally intended,
or because of unanticipated collateral factors, or because people have
adapted to them manipulatively and counter-productively (for example,
“teaching to the test”).
Each of these four practices is designed to institutionalize the kind
of confrontation between the inherited stock of operating rules and the
“irritations” of dissonant experience that Dewey saw as central to social
life.
Each attenuates the distinction between enactment and
implementation. Each diffuses the practice of deliberative re-assessment
throughout the organization as a continuous practice. In conventional
bureaucracies, such deliberation occurs only at the top and episodically. In
markets, it has no place at all.
The four practices are part of the conventional wisdom of modern
management reform, and they arrive in many variations, not all of which
vindicate pragmatist aspirations. Where the forms are adopted without a
sincere aspiration to alter practice, they may simply generate unproductive
paperwork and meetings. In some variants, they are designed less to foster
learning from frontline experience and more to tighten and expand
hierarchical control and induce greater fidelity to rigidly stipulated goals
and metrics. In these systems, goals and metrics tend to be promulgated at
the top without frontline input, and information from monitoring tends to
be used more punitively to induce greater effort than diagnostically to
enable greater efficacy. These systems resonate more with Foucauldian
critique than with Deweyan prescription; their administrative practices are
experienced as oppressive regimentation and surveillance more than as
opportunity for creativity and collaboration.
Even at their best, however, these systems may not appeal to all
participants. Some who have accommodated themselves to rule-governed
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bureaucracy may not welcome the call for initiative and creativity. They
may prefer predictable routine or the opportunities to pursue their
idiosyncratic projects within the interstices of formal rules. Moreover,
many nominally bureaucratic organizations in fact accord a good deal of
minimally supervised discretion to frontline workers, such as teachers or
police officers. For these workers, reform will increase demands that they
become more articulate about their practices. Some will resent the loss of
informality, spontaneity, and privacy.
No doubt many workers performed well under these informal
regimes, and many systems performed well as a whole. But even at their
best, these systems have limitations that have become increasingly
important. First, it is more difficult to learn and transmit learning in
informal systems. Where knowledge remains tacit, new recruits have to
be inducted through acculturation, which may be relatively expensive.
Moreover, tacit premises are harder to test, and efficacy cannot be
rigorously assessed across sites unless they are fully articulated. Finally, it
is more difficult to achieve accountability without explicit practices and
measures of performance. In the public realm, this is a problem of
democracy as well as efficiency.
C. Experimentalist Architecture
The organizational model that vindicates pragmatist aspirations
combines the four elements of post-bureaucratic organization with a more
general architecture. The most basic constituents of this architecture are a
“center” and a set of “local units”. In practice, the center is sometimes the
national government, and the local units, its federated states or
municipalities. Or the center could be a government agency, and the local
units the private actors it regulates or the public and private service
providers with which it contracts. Or the center might be a single public
or private organization with the local units its (territorial) subdivisions: a
state department of child welfare services and its regional districts, as one
example, or a school district and its individual schools, as another.
These relations are often nested, with an entity such as a school
district at once the local unit of a broader (state) jurisdiction and the center
of a territorial unit of its own; but the relation between continguous
“higher” and “lower” units is the similar, regardless of where they are
located within the system. Together, the center and the local units set and
revise goals, and the means of pursuing them in an iterative process.
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Governing norms – for example “adequate education” or “good water
status” – are formulated in general terms, and provisional measures for
gauging their achievement are specified, whether by legislation,
administrative action, or court order, through consultation among the
center and local units and relevant outside stakeholders. Local units are
explicitly given broad discretion to pursue these ends as they see fit. But
as a condition of this autonomy, the local units must report regularly on
their performance and submit to monitoring in which their results are
compared to other units employing alternative means to the same end.
The local units must explain their efforts to peers and superiors; show that
they have considered alternatives, and demonstrate that they are making
progress or are making plausible adjustments if not. The center provides
services and inducements that facilitate this disciplined comparison of
local performances and mutual learning among local units. Finally, the
framework goals, performance measures, and decision-making procedures
themselves are periodically revised on the basis of alternatives reported
and evaluated. And the cycle continues.
Neither “botton up” nor “decentralization” is an accurate term for
this architecture. It is not like a market (the conventional paradigm of
decentralized organization) because it has a center. But the center does
not correspond to the conventional notion of hierarchy because it is
facilitative and supportive, not directive. The key ambition is to combine,
in a manner responsive to Dewey’s aspirations, local initiative with
accountability.
II. Relation to Other Currents in Contemporary Legal Thought
Pragmatists are skeptical of the claims of other theories to
fundamental or comprehensive status, but they consider that many of them
may have useful tools for particular types of problems. So Democratic
Experimentalism does not so much dismiss the dominant theoretical
orientations as question their usefulness for many important questions,
especially those in the growing domain characterized by uncertainty.
Legal academics have tended to focus their theories on the position
of the judge confronting a hard case, one in which there are reasonable
arguments on both sides of a contested legal issue. The pre-eminent
responses have emphasized either interpretation or policy engineering.
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Interpretivists offer techniques by which the ambiguities of pertinent
authority can be resolved analytically. Policy engineers suggest that the
judge use her discretion to impose the most efficient resolution and offer
techniques, mostly derived from economics, for determining what it is.
Democratic Experimentalists, while conceding the power of these
approaches in some contexts, emphasize that they are not adequate for
many of the hard cases that pre-occupy the legal culture. Part of the
problem is the indeterminacy of governing authority. In hard cases, legal
authority often cannot be made, through analytical means, to yield
determinate answers. Rapid change in circumstances, and its correlate,
increased heterogeneity, exacerbate this indeterminacy. Efficiency norms
are also sometimes too ambiguous to yield specific resolutions. They are
most applicable in static comparisons, as in evaluating the allocative
effects of a change in a single rule, all else equal. Determining the
efficient solution when institutions and technologies are changing rapidly,
and when the decision itself could affect those changes, is incomparably
more difficult. In these situations, judges will lack the information
necessary to calculate reliably the effects of alternative rulings.
Both the interpretive and policy engineering perspectives are based
on Principal-Agent premises. The principal is presumed to have a
conception of a policy or plan detailed enough to induce agents — by
contract in a market; by promotion or penalty in a hierarchy —to
undertake particular tasks and to judge performance reliably enough to
reward success and punish failure. The judge is the agent; the legislature
or the broader polity is the principal. By contrast, experimentalists
suggest that many hard cases are hard precisely because the relevant
principal (however we conceive it) does not know what it intends or
desires.
This is because intent or desire depends on facts and
circumstances that are not yet known. Thus, intervention must be designed
in part as a form of investigation, and it must be reconsidered in the light
of experience.
In such situations, experimentalists suggest, the solution to a hard
case is less likely to be substantive than procedural or institutional. The
legal decision-maker adopts the normative output of various stakeholder
processes, or alternatively induces their formation or their reform. The
key criteria of legitimacy are openness to affected citizens and responsible
operation of the core features of post-bureaucratic organization.
Perhaps the most important antecedent of Democratic
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Experimentalism is the Legal Process school founded by Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks. A key theme of their perspective was that courts should
often resolve disputes by deferring to other institutions – agencies, trade
associations, standard-setting organizations. Deference was partly a
function of expertise, partly of procedural integrity. The court was
expected to condition deference on the procedural openness and
responsibility of the institution.
In urging this deference, the Legal Process school assumed
implicitly, however, that the chief problem confronting courts and
administration was official ignorance of facts known to private actors. In
economic regulation, for example, it assumed that both problems and
potential solutions were well understood by firms, even if conflicts-ofinterest and collective action problems inhibited implementation. Thus,
their remedy was public-private coordination between agencies and
organizations like trade associations and unions. Courts could assess the
adequacy of an agency’s efforts to acquire information and engage private
actors, but where those efforts seemed adequate, they should refrain from
deciding substantive matters independently. This procedural approach
reflected the institutional premises of the New Deal: a trusting view of
expertise and of regulatory agencies and a very limited sense of
democratic participation beyond elections or membership in quasicorporatist institutions like industrial associations and labor unions. They
were thus vulnerable to the critique of expertise and agency capture that
emerged from both the Left and Right in the 1960s and after; they were
equally unprepared for the rise of the civil rights, feminist, and other social
movements reflecting emergent interests with no place in the corporatist
scheme of the 1930s.
Democratic Experimentalism has a broader conception of
knowledge and politics. It focuses less on the problem of official
ignorance and more on the problem of uncertainty that limits the capacity
of both public and private actors to define problems and solutions in
advance of intervention. Uncertainty at once limits the value of expertise
and revalues diffuse, situational knowledge. It thus gives new force to
Dewey’s argument that ordinary citizens have information experts lack
and that relatively direct participation by affected people in public
problem-solving is a constitutive aspect of democracy.
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“Only the man

who wears the shoe knows where it pinches,” he wrote.
Democratic Experimentalism has some overlap with legal theories
that have responded to the civil rights revolution by reinterpreting
American public law in democratic terms. One important development in
this line is Bruce Ackerman's recent proposal to anchor constitutional
adjudication in the norm-generating capacity of spheres of social life, such
as schools or the workplace. Another is the "democratic constitutionalism"
of Robert Post and Reva Siegel, which emphasizes the interaction of the
courts with the other branches and especially with social movements.
But while Ackerman takes constitutional values to be inherent
in the activity of various social spheres, experimentalism assumes that
these values arise in mutually transformative dialogue between
individuals and institutions in their immediate contexts and courts
articulating the framing values of the society as a whole. While
democratic constitutionalism is preoccupied with contestation over
and construction of broad constitutional principle in its most inchoate
stages--when the identity of the actors and their institutional
configuration is most open--Democratic Experimentalism is focused
on the way broad norms are given meaning in more local
deliberations once identities and structures are becoming manifest.
Finally, there is some affinity between Democratic
Experimentalism and the academic movement to study and promote
“Alternative Dispute Resolution”. In contrast to most legal academic
endeavor, this work is focused on deliberation rather than analysis or
argument. And in principle at least, it is interested in problem-solving,
which it occasionally understands in institutional as well as psychological
terms. However, in much of this work, the core values are harmony and
stability. Deliberation is an ad hoc response to disruption, and its key
purpose is to re-establish equilibrium. Dewey's emphasis on the dangers
that consensus will ossify and on the need for institutionalized diversity as
a spur to re-assessment and discovery are absent.
III. Experimentalist Observations
In one sense, Dewey was ahead of his time. He had trouble
elaborating the specific practical implications of his ideas because when
he wrote there were few functioning organizations that embodied the more

12

original features of his prescriptions. But such organizations have
emerged in recent decades in response to basic social changes in
communication, transportation, and information technology.
Recent
scholarship has sought to interpret these developments in the light of
Deweyan experimentalism. Repeatedly, it turns out that legal regimes
conventionally thought of as consisting of general substantive rules
involve generalist law makers inducing or policing “contextualizing
regimes” in which stakeholders, facing increasing uncertainty, engage and
revise norms continuously.
A. Private Law
In the classical view that is still the starting point of the law
curriculum, contract is the paradigmatic form of private law, and contract
defines a process by which individuals (or organizations who can be
treated for this purpose as individuals) make binding exchanges. The
picture emphasizes judges and legislatures making general substantive
rules and actors transacting within them.
Within this view, interpretivist views compete with policyengineering ones, and formalist interpretivist views compete with
contextualist interpretivist views. But a longstanding and recently reinvigorated strand of contracts scholarship has suggested that these
debates are irrelevant or peripheral to the practical stakes in most disputes.
It argues descriptively and normatively for a more procedural approach.
One category of contract that escapes the classical contexts was
explored by Hart and Sacks and allied scholars. These are contracts
between businesses based on standard terms and often enforced through
specialized arbitration procedures. The standard terms are not negotiated
in individual contracts. They are incorporated wholesale by reference or
in the form of boilerplate, or they may be drawn on by enforcers to resolve
ambiguities in language. Trade associations often coordinate stakeholder
participation to administer and revise the terms and processes. When trade
associations act by themselves in these capacities, the arrangements are
referred to as private legal systems. But often, as in the cases that drew the
attention of Hart and Sacks, problems such as externalities or imbalances
of power call for public bodies to participate in defining terms,
enforcement, or dispute resolution, or all three.
A different and important category involves situations where
uncertainty is high and there are few potential parties to any particular
agreement. In these arrangements, the goal is not to regulate the exchange
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of a determinate class of goods or services, but to establish a collaborative
regime for the development of some new product or technique that neither
party can specify ex ante. Here principal-agent relations break down in
their paradigmatic setting. Neither party can form the idea of a project and
its feasibility without the help of the other, and innovation becomes
explicitly social in the way Dewey imagined.
As research-anddevelopment activities are disaggregated across firms, we see more
“contracts for innovation”. Instead of defining incentives to perform
particular tasks, such contracts establish processes of consultation and
information exchange — regular meetings with information-forcing
decision rules — that allow each party to determine the probity and
capacity of the other, and both to determine the feasibility of a project
while protecting themselves against the vulnerabilities that collaboration
creates. Once collaboration begins to work, high switching costs —the
expense of finding a partner as trustworthy and capable of learning as the
current one — provide the assurance necessary for both parties to make
project-specific investments even in the absence of formal agreement.
Such contracts are designed to be self-enforcing in most situations. They
give each party numerous opportunities to detect opportunism or
incapacity in the other and the rights at various stages to terminate the
relation when it is not satisfied. Thus, the contracts do not often reach the
courts. When they do and a court finds fault, the appropriate remedy will
usually be reliance damages (compensating the plaintiff for expenses
incurred in the fruitless collaboration) rather than expectation damages
(reproducing the state in which the contract would have been executed)
because these contracts presuppose that the parties cannot know what to
expect from their collaboration.
A third category includes standardized mass contracts for the
purchase of consumer goods. Neither the private law system nor the legal
process solutions are applicable since consumers have no opportunities to
bargain and are not effectively represented in industry associations. But it
seems unlikely that courts have the specialized knowledge or the capacity
for rapid adaptation needed to police evolving seller practices (although
advocates of contextualizing interpretivism in contract have long
maintained, on scant evidence, that they do). Public regulation of fair and
unfair contract terms is required; but such regulation has to be able to

14

respond to the highly innovative — and often devious — efforts by sellers
to game existing rules. Promising administrative regimes are being
constructed in the European Union and in the US (by the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency), and we take up their general features below.
B. Public Law: Regulation and Social Welfare
The conception of the administrative state dominant in legal
thought for most of the 20th century saw administration as a balance of
bureaucracy and discretion.
Bureaucracy meant hierarchically
promulgated rules. Discretion was grounded in expert knowledge at the
top or street-level intuition at the frontline, but in either case it was never
fully articulable and often presumed ineffable. Administration was
checked for individual entitlements by adjudicatory processes. But
administrative adjudication of individual claims was considered a separate
and self-contained process insulated from line administration.
Both the rule of law and democratic control were identified with
bureaucracy. A major pre-occupation of administrative law was the
promulgation of rules and assessment of their compatibility with statutes.
But most people recognized that because rules were inflexible and could
not address small contingencies and unforeseeable circumstances, some
residuum of discretion was needed. On both the right and the left,
unhappiness with administrative practice tended to produce demands for
more and tighter rules and less discretion. At times, there was a tendency
to treat discretion as unreviewable by outsiders, including courts. An
alternative approach subjected discretion to “reasaonableness review,”
which was usually portrayed as minimal and relatively formless duty to
provide an intelligible explanation.
From about the 1970s, the nature of the social problems and the
public interventions that produced this conception of administration
changed. The paradigmatic New Deal regulatory programs were sectoral
entry-and-price regimes, such as those in communications, transportation,
and energy. In conjunction with macro-economic regulation, they were
designed to produce relative stability and calculability. The paradigmatic
social welfare initiatives were social insurance programs – Social Security
and Unemployment Insurance. These were explicitly based on actuarial
premises. Uncertainty undermined the calculability of outcomes on which
both the regulation and welfare programs depended, and social change
produced new problems for which the New Deal models were ill-adapted.
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Entry-and-price sectoral regulation came undone for three reasons.
The first was capture of the regulatory authorities by private interests:
Incumbent firms often used regulatory decisions to protect themselves
against challengers. Second, new developments blurred the boundaries
among sectors, so that the defense of stability increasingly seemed to
obstruct innovation. Third, new economy-wide regulatory challenges had
become prominent, such as health-and-safety and environmental and
consumer protection, that cut across industrial sectors and thus demanded
different institutional configurations.
Social policy also became pre-occupied with problems for which
its New Deal antecedents had not prepared it. Education is a leading
example. The shift towards a high-skill economy, and the corresponding
loss of stable, well paid unskilled and semi-skilled work, made attainment
of levels of literacy and numeracy far above historical norms a
precondition for successful participation in labor markets. Schools must
therefore be re-organized to meet the needs of the large, but diverse
groups of students whose family background has not prepared them to
come to class ready to learn on their own. As learning problems are often
associated with psychological problems or family stress, moreover, the
burden of providing new forms of pedagogy is increased by the need for
coordination with providers other social services as well. At the same
time, government has assumed increasing responsibility for health care.
While some health care provision has long been organized on the model of
insurance, that model has been strained, for example, by the problems
associated with adverse selection, by defective incentives for motivating
preventive care (because private insurers worry that turnover will prevent
them from capturing long term gains), and by insurer opportunism
(finding excuses to deny coverage when insureds become seriously ill).
One response to these circumstances has been to give up on
complex organization and to attempt to achieve administrative ends
through simulation of markets. By pricing rights or duties and making
them tradeable, such regimes hope to assign them to the most efficient
producers and spur technological innovation. The best-known examples
are tradeable emissions permits and school vouchers. Although market
simulation approaches have been much discussed in the legal academy,
their practical effects have been minor. This disappointment is partly due
to political opposition from emitters of greenhouse gases and teachers’
unions. But it may also be due to limitations of the basic conception.
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Markets are attractive because they promise to limit information demands
on all participants. But the design of simulated markets can create
extraordinary information burdens, for example, with respect to the setting
of prices or quantities. Moreover, simulated markets require elaborate
regulatory efforts to constrain undesired consequences of the very selfregarding behavior the markets are meant to encourage. Ingenious efforts
must be made, for example, to restrain the tendency of pollution emitters
to cluster in “hot spots” under a tradeable permit regime or schools to
attract and select students who need the least help under a voucher regime.
The alternative tendency, which has been for more salient in
practice, is the move toward experimentalist architecture. Whether
through legislative design or administrative initiative, programs have
sought to structure a relation between a center and local units that
combines decentralized initiative with learning and accountability.
In the regulatory sphere, a key development is meta-regulation.
Rather than presuming to write uniform rules based on the expertise
available to it, the meta-regulator aims to induce heterogeneous groundlevel actors—firms— to actively investigate the particular risks they face
and how best to mitigate them. Elements is this approach were pioneered
in the nuclear power safety program administered by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators and
by the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP) food safety
regime developed initially in the US in the private sector.
A
comprehensive system of meta-regulation has been recently mandated by
the Food Safety Modernization Act. Each firm must make its own plan to
achieve regulatory goals within uniform parameters, and must measure its
own performance under its plan in terms of stipulated metrics. The firms
must report unexpected adverse events, such as “near misses”, and respond
to such reports by considering ways to mitigate the dangers they reveal.
The regulator verifies the adequacy of the initial plan, including the
monitoring regime, and reviews responses to reports of adverse events.
As more successful plans are identified, some of their features may
be codified as mandatory. Typically, however, actors have substantial
discretion to substitute alternative measures to the extent they can
demonstrate that they are equally effective. The regulator enforces basic
substantive parameters, but a major part of its activity involves
management of the experimentalist process that include root cause
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analysis of significant operating events, peer review, and continuous
assessment of performance metrics.
Similar developments can be observed in social services. Health
care has long been ambitiously experimentalist. Rigorous empiricism in
the form of the randomized control trials have been central here, and the
key features of experimentalist organization – rolling rules, root-cause
analysis, peer review, and performance measurement – have been
developed with great sophistication. As government has assumed
increasing responsibility for health care costs, these features have been
adopted into the relevant public law.
The same trends can be found, albeit at less elaborated stages, in
child protective services, disability, and poverty relief. Regimes in these
fields were typically preoccupied with balancing bureaucracy (rules) and
frontline professionalism (low-visibility discretion). Initiatives of recent
decades impose experimentalist disciplines.
Education illustrates this evolution. Among several developments
that have challenged traditional administration in education, we can
mention two. First, there is the growing awareness of the poor
performance of U.S. schooling in international comparisons, the class- and
race-based variation in attainment within the US, and the recurrent finding
that educational success correlates only weakly with financial resources.
Second, there is the growing sense that, for many struggling students,
effective teaching requires tailored interventions that take account of
individual needs.
The first set of developments has led to a move toward “evidencebased” practice in which educators both within and across schools
continuously assess interventions both informally at the school and
classroom level and more formally across schools. The second set has led
toward more emphasis on individual diagnosis and tailoring. The initial
step here was the adoption of “special education” programs for students
with medically diagnosed “learning disabilities”. But at the margin it
proved hard both in principle and in practice to distinguish students
lagging because of disabilities from those lagging for other reasons.
In consequence of these developments, there has been a
transformation in the architecture of schooling. The most salient
manifestation of these developments are the No Child Left Behind Act of
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2002 and the Obama administration’s modification of the statutory scheme
with its waiver and Race to the Top grant programs. The most discussed
feature of this regime is its initially very crude accountability measures,
mandating high-stakes performance assessment with severe penalties for
schools that do not hit aggregate testing targets. But this feature, which
has been much refined since the statute’s enactment, is related to two
others. First, the emphasis on performance assessment is in practice
related to a general tendency to give more autonomy to local school
systems and individual schools. Schools have been released from a range
of rigid rules that dictated resource-use and instructional practice. The
emphasis on performance measures is an effort to achieve accountability
without rigidifying practice. Moreover, the initial emphasis on highstakes rewards and sanctions has given way to a more diagnostic and
remedial approach. Tests and other forms of review are designed to
uncover specific deficits at student and school level and to indicate
specific remedial interventions. Race to the Top emphasizes “instructional
improvement systems” that scan practice at other schools for interventions
that have proven successful for specific problems.
Second, there is a tendency toward greater individuation of
instruction.

The type of tailored assessment associated with “special

needs” students has been gradually generalized. No Child Left Behind
specifically declares that “all children” have a right to an education that
enables them to attain at least basic proficiency, and it requires that all
failing schools provide their students with supplemental resources. These
efforts require interventions that are more tailored and provisional than
bureaucratic administration provides. At the same time, they differ from
traditional professionalism in demanding explicit and articulate planning
and assessment, rather than deference to ineffable expertise.
C. Civil Rights
The Civil Rights revolution of the Warren and Burger Court eras
was centrally pre-occupied with explicitly invidious or egregiously
reckless official behavior. De jure racial segregation is the paradigm
example of the first; police use of deadly force against non-violent people
suspected of minor crimes is a salient example of the second. Courts were
able to derive plausible substantive rules to control such behavior.
But the success of the revolution changed the issues. Explictly
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invidious discrimination virtually disappeared from public life.
Discrimination became inarticulate and even unconscious. Moreover,
much official behavior that was not egregiously reckless nevertheless
burdened civil rights values in ways widely perceived as unfair. Thus,
“second generation” civil rights cases tended to challenge behavior that
was not openly intended to harm civil rights values and that had some
legitimate purposes.
In effect, second generation claims seek to move the standard from
intent to negligence and to frame the issue in terms of a duty to reasonably
consider and weigh civil rights values against others. Doctrine sometimes
resists such a duty and clings to intent-focused norms. The result is either
the dismissal of all second-generation claims or a willingness to infer
intent from the “disparate impact” of an official action on a protected
group or value. Since intent is highly elusive both conceptually and
factually, outcomes under the latter approach often turn on assignment of
the burden of proof. If the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the
inference, the plaintiff has a good chance of winning; otherwise not.
Another approach to second-generation problems comes closer to
recognizing a duty of reasonable consideration. This can be seen in
Americans with Disabilities Act duty of “reasonable accommodation”. It
is also implicit in the stronger forms of “disparate impact” doctrine that
hold that an inference of discrimination is not rebutted where the
defendant has failed to adopt an alternative practice that serves its
legitimate purposes but is less burdensome to civil rights values.
Once we get to this point, however, we encounter the familiar
problem of elusive and asymmetric knowledge. Defendants have much
more information about the legitimate costs and benefits of controversial
practices than plaintiffs and judges, and traditional litigation is a very
expensive and cumbersome way to induce them to disgorge it.
There is thus good reason to frame second-generation civil rights
enforcement in terms of an obligation to engage in experimentalist
collaboration in specifying and solving problems. In fact, we do see
promising examples of such framing. The provisions of the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act on discrimination in pretrial
detention and the Prison Rape Elimination Act adopt experimentalist
architecture. Each declares general goals and then mandates that agencies,
within uniform parameters, develop plans to advance the goals within their
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facilities. The plans must be periodically assessed. Performance measures
are used to identify superior performers and to target laggards for remedial
intervention. Adverse incidents must be subjected to root cause analysis.
Central institutions collect information on effective practice and make it
generally available.
The core norm in this model is a (partly implicit) duty of
reasonable consideration that is elaborated through a series of
contextualizing regimes. Courts and other generalist enforcers would
enforce procedural requirements for planning, monitoring, and reassessment. They would also enforce basic substantive requirements
where there was adequate information and understanding to declare such
requirements. The operation of the regimes would themselves generate
information and understanding that might make it possible to recognize
new practice as mandatory. In effect, the courts would set substantive
requirements on the basis of observed performance among the regulated
units.
D. International Law
International law was traditionally identified with treaties and with
customary principles.
However, as with domestic private law,
international regimes have increasingly confronted problems that are not
adequately addressed either by negotiated rules or ineffable principle.
They call for organizations capable of adaptation.
The encompassing, post-war international organizations do not
seem viable for these new tasks. The United Nations and its specialized
agencies together with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now transformed into
the World Trade Organization) integrated large numbers of countries into
regimes governing broad ranges of issues. Such regimes depended
crucially on the global dominance of the United States, which could
pressure other countries to cooperate. With the emergence of a series of
countries able to resist US pressure, regimes must now accommodate a
greater degree of diversity of preferences. Thus, the newer regimes tend
to be more specialized in scope and less encompassing in membership
than those of the earlier epoch. In many domains there are two or more
regimes--"regime complexes"-- with partially overlapping, partially
competing aims, and their capacities for regimentation are
correspondingly limited.
All these trends favor experimentalist architecture. Thus, we see
the emergence of specialized international regimes that address specific
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problems in ways designed to accommodate volatility and diversity. A
notably successful example is the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting
Substances. Established by international agreement in 1989, the regime
consists of a cluster of central administrative bodies that coordinate
national efforts to reduce harm to the atmospheric ozone layer. The
regime sets schedules for reducing, and ultimately banning, the use of
ozone-depleting substances subject to exceptions where technical
committees find no substitutes are available. Member states report to the
center on practices and outcomes and submit to monitoring by the center.
The center administers a fund to subsidize the costs of transition for
developing countries. It also supports and publicizes research on new
technologies and provides technical assistance. The regime has achieved
remarkable results and large changes in behavior. The main mechanisms
appear to have been collaborative learning induced or at least buttressed
against the risks of defection by the threat of trade sanctions as the penalty
for violations, particularly the failure to report accurately on performance.
The European Union (EU) is another, perhaps more striking,
instance of Democratic Experimentalism beyond the state. The EU is not a
nation-state, since it joins independently self-governed polities, nor is it an
international organization, since it intrudes in unprecedented degree into
its members’ domestic affairs. It does, however, fit the specifications of
experimentalist polyarchy, linking heterogeneous but interdependent units
in an epoch of increasing uncertainty. And in fact key features of this
architecture have been observed in regulation of networked industries,
notably communications and energy, as well as in the regulation of health
and safety, the environment, pharmaceuticals, food safety, and commercial
aviation. The model has been more recently extended tentatively in other
areas, including financial services and human rights.
These areas are governed by “framework directives” that specify
general goals but contemplate variation in implementation among member
states. Rules take a rolling or presumptive form. “Comply or explain” is
the norm. A state must follow the rule or explain why its departure as
served the underlying purposes as well or better. Many regimes have
significant event reporting systems that demand diagnostic follow-up.
Peer reviews processes in which member state performance in a given area
is assessed and critiqued by teams of experts from other member states,
are common. Demanding reporting requirements and performance
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indicators are also frequent.
IV. Recurring Issues
A. Domain
Dewey spoke of Democratic Experimentalism as a general model
of political organization. Contemporary experimentalists often take this
tone as well, but they also speak of experimentalism as a response to
specific social conditions of fluidity and diversity. The experimentalist
literature suggests that current social and economic change favors the
expansion of experimentalism. But assuming this is so, the question
remains whether the traditional legal regimes that emphasize general and
stable rules enforced substantively by generalist officials will continue to
play an important role. A pragmatist has no resources for excluding this
possibility categorically. For now we observe only that in domain after
domain the frontier of law is experimentalist.
B. Soft v. Hard Law
The Democratic Experimentalist architecture emphasizes
collaboration and deliberation. To some, this emphasis implies voluntary
participation and is thus incompatible with coercion.
Thus,
Experimentalism is said to have an affinity with “soft law” – law that
operates by carrots rather than sticks, or by sticks that take only the
intangible form of shaming or reputational harm.
As a descriptive matter, it is not correct to conflate
Experimentalism with “soft law”. Some regimes have quite conventional
coercive sanctions and even unconventional sanctions often involve
tangible harm. Experimentalism is dominantly procedural. Sanctions for
failing to comply with procedural duties can be conventional and harsh.
Failure to supply required information, falsification of reports, or
persistent failure to correct norm infractions under these regimes can lead
to exclusion from valuable markets or criminal sentences, for example.
The characteristic tangible sanctions in these regimes tend to take the form
of a “penalty defaults”. As originally defined in the contracts context, a
penalty default is a provisional resolution imposed in situations where the
decision-maker does not know as well as the parties what the best
resolution is. It is designed, not to approximate the best resolution, but to
induce the parties to negotiate a better one. A favorite example is a rule
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under the Endangered Species Act that precludes development that would
impair the habitat of a listed endangered species. The statute provides an
exception where the administrator commits to implement an adequate
“Habitat Conservation Plan” to mitigate harm from the development. A
key criterion of adequacy is the approval of the plan by stakeholders.
Here, the penalty default is a prohibition of development. This is a
tangible and harsh mandate. However, it is designed to induce the
developer to engage stakeholders and to produce a plan that is likely to be
better than one that the regulators could devise on their own.
C. Distributive Issues
People sometimes worry that experimentalism is insensitive to
distributive issues and that the move to experimentalist regimes will
exacerbate the situation of disadvantaged stakeholders. They are, of
course, clearly right to emphasize that the outcome of a collaborative
process will be affected by the relative resources of the participants. Even
if a group’s consent is required to go forward, that consent may be
inflected by the group’s disadvantage. Experimentalist regime design does
try to take account of these factors in three ways.
First, procedural design can try to mitigate inequality. A neutral
can be charged with moderating discussions to insure everyone is heard.
Some or all participants can be given funds to use for assistance in
researching or articulating their positions.
Second, if design can reach background default rules, than it can
enhance equality by shaping the rule that will govern in the absence of
stakeholder agreement. The Endangered Species Act penalty default is a
good example. Before the Act, the default rule permitted the developer to
go ahead without taking account of stakeholder views. The penalty
default changes the balance of power in ways that make it more likely
both that there will be engagement and that any agreement will be fair.
Third, certain possible outcomes can be ruled out as substantively
unacceptable. An outcome that involves explicit racial or gender
discrimination or the expropriation of a non-participant’s property, for
example, can be excluded at the outset.
But even after such constraints are adopted, anxiety about equality
may persist. The problem is that it will rarely be possible to fully specify
in advance the effects of inequality and hence to identify the extent to
which the outcome has been affected by it.
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